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The answer to the question of whether a partner can also simultaneously be an 
employee of his partnership has long been considered to be settled law.  
However, the introduction of limited liability partnerships (LLPs) in 2001 has not 
only raised the new question of whether LLP members can also be employees but 
has, in doing so, reopened the question of the employment status of partners, 
questions which now need to be viewed in the context of the widespread practice 
of having both equity and other types of partner/member.  Furthermore, with 
much legislation now giving rights to ‘workers’ rather than employees, the 
question has arisen of whether LLP members or partners can also simultaneously 
be workers, regardless of whether they can also be employees.  The answers to 
these questions go to the very heart of what the law regards as an employer-
employee or firm-worker relationship, yet recent legislation and jurisprudence 
have failed to clarify the legal position.  This article explores the employee and 
worker status of partners and LLP members, and the consequences both for them 
and for the development of the law. 
 
1 Introduction 
In order to establish whether partners or LLP members can (and should be 
allowed to) be simultaneously also employees or workers, and whether there is 
any difference for this purpose between different types of partner/member, this 
article first assesses the current state of the law, and then examines the case for 
treating partners and LLP members similarly despite the differences between 
partnerships and LLPs. It then compares the consequences of the different legal 
statuses for the individuals, their firms and third parties. The challenges 
encountered in applying the law in practice to differentiate between 
partners/members, employees and workers are then analysed.  Finally, 
conclusions are drawn about the current state of the law and likely future 
developments. 
 
2 Partner and/or employee? : the rule in partnership law against 
dual status 
It has long been established by the courts that a true partner (typically an equity 
partner who takes part in management, contributes capital and shares profits) 
cannot also be an employee of the partnership, because a partnership is not a 
separate legal person to its partners (except in Scotland1) and it is not possible in 
principle for an individual to employ himself: Mathew LJ in Ellis v Joseph Ellis & Co 
described the circumstance of being both an employer and an employee as ‘a 
legal impossibility’.2  This approach is consistent with the unitary conception of 
the employer.3  In addition, as Lord Donaldson MR noted in Cowell v Quilter 
Goodison Co Ltd, the partnership relationship is ‘wholly different’ from the 
employment relationship,4 and this is discussed further below.  As recently as 
2009, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) in Train v DTE Business Advisory 
Services Ltd & Associated Companies t/a DTE Chartered Accounts and others 
                                                        
* Reader in Law, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, email 
elspeth.berry@ntu.ac.uk, ORCID ID orcid.org/0000-0001-8325-5356.  I wish to thank Professor 
Geoffrey Morse, Kay Wheat, Peter McTigue and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.  
Any errors or omissions remain my own. 
1 Partnership Act, s 4(2).   
2 [1905] 1 KB 324 (CA) 329.   
3 Jeremias Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (OUP, 2015) 16-19.   
4 [1989] IRLR 392 (CA) 393.   
 2 
described the premise that ‘a full equity partner cannot be an employee of a 
business’ as ‘uncontroversial’.5   
 
This established view was challenged in Clyde & Co LLP v Bates van Winkelhof6 by 
the charity Public Concern at Work, which argued that it was not the law that 
partners could not also be employees, since the judgment in Ellis predated s82 of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, which provides that ‘Any covenant….or agreement 
entered into by a person with himself and one or more other persons shall be 
construed and be capable of being enforced…. as if…. entered into with the other 
person or persons alone’. Since a partner could make some contracts with the 
partners collectively, there was no reason why he could not be employed by the 
partnership.  Lady Hale, giving the leading judgment, described this as ‘a serious 
challenge’,7 while Lord Clarke, despite dissenting on other points, stated ‘There is 
to my mind much to be said for the view that if the appellant had been a 
partner…she would now be treated as an employee.8 
 
However, both explicitly left this issue undecided, while Lord Carnwath, citing in 
support the Law Commissions9 and Lindley & Banks on Partnership,10 said that he 
was ‘unpersuaded’:11 first, the judgment in Cowell did not predate s82; second, 
Ellis did not turn simply on the lack of capacity to contract but on the nature of 
the relationship of the parties, which was one of partnership; and third, a 
contract between a partner and his co-partners, which might be effective in law 
for many purposes, could not be equated with a contract between the partner and 
the firm as such, since each partner was an essential part of the firm. These 
cogent points found favour in the subsequent cases of Walsh and others v 
Needleman Treon (A Firm) and others and Altus Group (UK) Limited v Baker Tilly 
Tax and Advisory Services LLP and another, in which the courts held that the 
traditionally understood position of partners was ‘common ground’12 and ‘settled 
law’,13 and that there was ‘much to be said for Lord Carnwath’s… explanation’.14 
 
3 LLP member and/or employee?: s4(4) of the LLP Act 
The root of the problem of the employment status of LLP members is s4(4) of the 
Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (LLP Act), which purports to determine 
whether an LLP member can also be an employee.  It provides that: 
‘A member of a limited liability partnership shall not be regarded for any 
purpose as employed by the limited liability partnership unless, if he and 
the other members were partners in a partnership, he would be regarded 
for that purpose as employed by the partnership.’ 
At first blush, therefore, the position seems straightforward: s4(4) cross refers to 
partnership law, which prohibits simultaneous partner and employee status. This 
is supported by the rationale for s4(4) provided during the passage of the Bill - 
‘to ensure that members are not employees of the [LLP]’15 - and the explanation 
that s6 (on the agency of members) ‘should not mean that members are treated 
as employees….It is our intention to make sure that members should not be 
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regarded as employees because they are members’.16 Accordingly, the courts in 
Tiffin v Lester Aldridge LLP17 and Reinhard v Ondra LLP and others18 concluded 
that since the LLP member in question would have been held to be a partner had 
the LLP been a partnership, and therefore could not have been employed by it, he 
could not be an employee of the LLP.  
 
However, as the Court of Appeal noted in Tiffin, if s4(4) were to be applied 
literally, no LLP member could ever be an employee, since he could never have 
been an employee when a partner.  This would make the second part of s4(4) 
redundant although, as it further noted, ‘[u]nfortunately, the authors of section 
4(4) were apparently unaware of this’.  In fairness, during its legislative passage 
Lord Phillips of Sudbury presciently described it as ‘work for lawyers, however 
well intentioned’ while Baroness Buscombe noted ‘I have read it more than half a 
dozen times and wonder if we can improve on the wording’.19  The unsatisfactory 
wording may be due to a change of approach during the legislative process, from 
simple confirmation that membership status would not of itself confer 
employment status, to a complete prohibition on members being an employees: 
it was at one point proposed ‘that the Bill should make clear that a member of an 
LLP will not be an employee of the LLP unless there is express agreement to that 
effect between the member and the LLP’ (author’s emphasis),20 but it was 
subsequently noted that this was inconsistent with employment law which, as 
discussed below, does not regard as conclusive the labels given by the parties to 
their relationship21 and explained that ‘Members of an LLP are not usually treated 
as employees’ and ‘will not be treated as employees (in the context of 
employment rights)’ (author’s emphasis).22 Nonetheless, as Warren J put it in 
Ondra:23 ‘Section 4(4), on a literal wording, leads to an absurdity in that it posits 
an impossible situation under English law’. The question which arises, then, is 
what the second part of s4(4) means, if anything. In attempting to address this 
question, the courts have created some confusion.   
 
First, in so far as s4(4) replicates partnership law, the doubts cast by Lady Hale 
and Lord Clarke in some of the judgments in Clyde24 on whether partnership law 
does indeed prevent a partner from being an employee equally cast doubt on 
whether s4(4) prevents an LLP member from being an employee.   
 
Second, the Court of Appeal in Tiffin laid down an unnecessarily complicated two-
part test.25  First, it was necessary to ascertain whether the member would have 
been regarded as a partner had the firm been a partnership.  If he would, then he 
could not be an employee.  If he would not, a second enquiry was required as to 
whether he would have been an employee of the notional partnership. In Clyde 
the Supreme Court held that this two-stage process was unnecessary, Lady Hale 
stating that 
‘there is no need to give such a strained construction to section 4(4). All 
that [s4(4)] is saying is that, whatever the position would be were the LLP 
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members to be partners in a traditional partnership, then the position is 
the same in an LLP’.26 
Admittedly, Tiffin concerned employment status whereas Clyde involved worker 
status, and the Supreme Court’s comments on the interpretation of s4(4) and 
employee status might therefore be obiter dicta, because they were ‘[a]n opinion 
given in court [which is] not necessary to the judgment’27 rather than forming 
part of the binding ratio decidendi. However, it was subsequently held in Ondra28  
that it had indeed been necessary for the Supreme Court to interpret s4(4) in 
order to determine whether it applied to workers, and that its comments on s4(4) 
were therefore not obiter.  
 
Finally, the Court of Appeal in Tiffin provided apparently contradictory statements 
on whether a member could also be an employee.  On the one hand, the two part 
test appears to rule out such dual status, and indeed the Court of Appeal 
explicitly disagreed with the EAT’s suggestion in Kovats v TFO Management LLP 
and another29 that even where a member would have been a partner, there was 
still scope to examine whether he would also have been an employee.30 On the 
other, the Court of Appeal stated that  
‘it is clear that a member of a limited liability partnership can be an 
employee of it: that is what section 4(4) recognises’.31   
This apparent conflict can be resolved once it is recognised that the only 
members who ‘can’ be employees are those who are registered as members but 
are not true members.  The court in Ondra subsequently drew this distinction 
more clearly, giving as an example of the latter 
‘an employee [who] is made a member of the LLP but obtains no rights 
other than the right to continue to receive his salary’, 
and noting that such a person would be in a similar position to  
‘a so-called salaried partner in a traditional partnership in those cases 
where the salaried partner is not a partner at all‘.32 
Partnership law has never imposed a blanket ban on all partners from 
simultaneously being employees,33 only on true partners (typically those who 
take part in management, contribute capital, and/or shares profits). Thus, while a 
true LLP member cannot be an employee, a person who is described as a 
member but who is not a true member can be.   
 
The law has recognised the possibility of different categories of LLP membership 
in other contexts. When LLPs were first introduced, HMRC taxed all registered LLP 
members in the same way as true partners,34 an approach which was consistent 
with the failure of the legislature to recognise the distinction between true and 
other partners when drafting s4(4).  The government considered that HMRC’s 
failure to make the necessary equivalent distinction between true and other LLP 
members gave rise to unfairness, market distortions and tax avoidance35 and 
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therefore introduced remedial provisions36 in order to distinguish between LLP 
members who are in fact disguised employees and should be taxed as such, and 
true members who continue to be taxed in the same way as true partners.37 
Arguably, different categories of LLP membership were also acknowledged in F & 
C Alternative Investment (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy and others, in which the 
court held that an LLP member who did not have control over the affairs or 
property of the LLP did not owe it a fiduciary duty.38   
 
An interpretation of s4(4) of the LLP Act that aligns partners and LLP members in 
relation to employment status is consistent with the similarities of their roles. 
Partnerships and LLPs both require two or more persons to carry on business 
together with a view of profit,39 albeit that this requirement only applies to LLPs 
on formation; and as the roles of both partners and members combine ownership 
with management, many of the legislative provisions which govern these roles in 
default of contrary agreement – including their rights, duties, admission and 
withdrawal – are similar.40 Aligning their treatment is also consistent with the tax 
position, because LLP members are treated as partners for tax purposes41 and 
partners and members can only be taxed as employees or as self employed and 
not both.   
 
There are, of course, important differences between partnerships and LLPs, 
reflecting the fact that LLPs were introduced after intensive lobbying from large 
professional practices who were unhappy with the unlimited personal liability of 
partners in general partnerships42 in the context of ever increasing partnership 
sizes, and of an increase in the number and extent of claims against professional 
firms who were perceived to have deep pockets because of that unlimited 
liability.43 What they sought, and largely achieved, was a corporate body with 
separate legal personality44 whose members have limited liability,45 albeit with 
exceptions.46 The quid pro quo for these advantages is that while partnerships 
have complete flexibility and informality, with no statutory intrusion into their 
governance and complete privacy of internal arrangements, LLPs have 
registration,47 accounting and filing requirements48 similar to companies, although 
they are not obliged to register any formal internal agreement.  
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Nonetheless, it is submitted that these differences do not justify different 
approaches being taken to the employment status of partners and LLP members. 
First, these differences explain why it was necessary to include s4(4) in the LLP 
Act, in order to ensure that they did not result in different approaches being 
taken to employment status.  Second, although separate legal personality means 
that there is no conceptual difficulty in an LLP employing its members just as a 
company can employ its directors, and the Supreme Court in Clyde suggested 
that the arguments about whether a partner could be an employee might be 
different if the firm had separate legal personality,49 there are doubts as to 
whether a Scottish partnership - which does have separate legal personality50 - 
can employ a partner.51 Furthermore, when the Law Commissions proposed that 
an English partnership be given separate legal personality, they also proposed 
that it should not be able to employ its partners because ‘the status, rights and 
obligations of a partner [are] wholly different from those of an employee’ and ‘a 
dual role as a partner and an employee could call into question the tax status and 
even the existence of a partnership’.52  Third, although s1(5) of the LLP Act states 
that 
‘except as far as otherwise provided by this Act or any other enactment, 
the law relating to partnerships does not apply to a limited liability 
partnership’, 
the LLP legislation actually makes considerable reference to partnership law.  It is 
thus inevitable that the courts will place considerable reliance on existing 
partnership law when interpreting those elements of the LLP legislation, and 
indeed s4(4) is not merely in the category of provisions which are modelled on 
partnership law, it explicitly refers to it. 
 
4 LLP members/partners and worker status 
The Supreme Court in Clyde53 ruled that the determination of whether an LLP 
member was a worker under s230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and 
thus protected as a whistleblower, did not depend on whether a partner in the 
same situation would have been a worker, because s4(4) of the LLP Act only 
applied to employee and not worker status.  There was thus no prohibition in 
principle on a true member being a worker.   
 
Whether the same applies to true partners has not yet been established.  Given 
the alignment of partners and LLP members in terms of employee status, drawing 
a distinction between them in terms of worker status could cause confusion, and 
the similarities in their roles suggest that if being a worker can be consistent with 
being a true LLP member, it can also be consistent with being a true partner.  
There are also compelling policy reasons, discussed below, in favour of extending 
worker status.  However, as s4(4) does not apply to worker status there is no 
statutory alignment of LLP members and partners in this respect, while s1(5) 
explicitly allows a divergence.  In addition, a partnership’s lack of separate legal 
personality means that, unlike an LLP, it may not be regarded as ‘another party’ 
for the purposes of the statutory definition of a worker.  This will be discussed 
further below.   
 
5 The consequences of status 
                                                        
49 (n6) [18] (Lady Hale).   
50 Partnership Act, s 4(2).   
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Council v Minister of National Insurance 1947 SC 629 (IH), 636 (Lord Cooper P) it ‘[a]ssum[ed] 
without deciding that in Scotland a partner can enter into a contract for service with his own firm’ 
although Lord Keith stated (at 639) that ‘I wish to reserve my opinion as to whether a partnership can 
so employ one of its partners under Scots law’.  
52 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Report on Partnership Law (n9) [13.41]-[13.43].   
53 (n6).   
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It is vital for individuals, firms and third parties to know whether a person is a 
partner/LLP member, or an employee and/or a worker, because of the 
consequences that flow from a particular status.  
 
a) Internal rights and duties  
Although internal duties and financial and management rights are governed by 
agreement rather than statute, and are therefore not necessarily determined by 
whether the individual is a partner/member or an employee or worker, the 
default rules which apply under the Partnership Act/the Limited Liability 
Partnership Regulations 2001 (LLP Regulations)54 in the absence of contrary 
agreement are applicable only to partners/an LLP and its members,55 while there 
are also rights and duties which attach only to employees, including the duty of 
obedience,56 or to employers, including the duty to pay wages57 and certain 
statutory duties (discussed further below).  That said, the rights and duties have 
some similarities; for example, the duties imposed on partners/LLP members and 
on employees58 include a duty not to compete with the business,59 they are all 
subject to a duty of skill and care60 (although the standard may vary61) and their 
acts may give rise to vicarious liability on the part of the firm62 or employer.63 
 
A further difference is that on dissolution of a partnership an employee may have 
a claim for a breach of his employment contract, albeit only if it is for a fixed term 
or there is a notice period and dissolution occurs prior to the end of this,64 and 
only if either the dissolution is total (i.e. the business comes to an end), or is 
what is sometimes described as a partial or technical dissolution (i.e. there is a 
change of partner but the business continues) but the firm is small or the 
employment contract was clearly made with reference to the original business or 
the original personnel only.65  
 
b) Non-discrimination and other statutory rights 
Employees benefit from some statutory protection that is not available to 
partners/LLP members, for example unfair dismissal, redundancy, and maternity 
and parental leave.66 Thus, in Palumbo v Styliano67 the tribunal’s conclusion that 
Palumbo had been a partner and not an employee meant that the termination of 
                                                        
54 SI 2001/1090.   
55 Partnership Act, ss 24, 25, 35, 37, 39, 42 and 44 and LLP Regulations 2001, Regs 7 and 8.  
56 Laws v London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 698 (CA). 
57 Miles v Wakefield MDC [1987] AC 539.   
58 Const v Harris (1824) Turn & R 496, (1924) 37 ER 1191 (partners), F & C (n37) (LLP members) and 
Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co v Ansell (1888) 39 Ch D 339 (CA) (employees).  
59 Partnership Act, s 24 (partners), LLP Regulations 2001, Reg 7 (LLP members) and Hivac Ltd v Park 
Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch 169 (employees).   
60 Tann v Herrington [2009] EWHC 445 (Ch), [2009] Bus LR 1051 (partners) and Harmer v Cornelius 
(1858) 5 CBNS 236 (QB) (employees).  It has not yet been established whether LLP members owe a 
duty of care to the LLP, although it is likely that they do, based either on their fiduciary duties or on 
ordinary principles of tort law. 
61 See further Elspeth Berry, ‘Partnership options in the UK: good things come in threes’ in Robert W. 
Hillman and Mark J. Loewenstein (eds), Research Handbook on Partnerships, LLCs and Alternative 
Forms of Business Organizations (Edward Elgar 2015).  
62 Partnership Act, ss 5, 6 and 10 and the LLP Act, s 6; see further Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam 
[2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366 [103ff] (Millett LJ) and Elspeth Berry, ‘The Criminal Liability of 
Partnerships and Partners: Increasing the Divergence between English and Scottish Partnership Law?’ 
(2014) 7 JBL 585, 591-593, 605.   
63 Majrowski v Guys and St Thomas Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 and Lloyd v Grace, Smith 
& Co [1912] AC 716 (HL).   
64 Briggs v Oates [1990] ICR 473.  
65 Brace v Calder [1895] 2 QB 252 (CA), Phillips v Alhambra Palace Company [1901] QB 59 (QB), 
Briggs (n64) 482 (Scott J) and Rose v Dodd [2005] EWCA Civ 957, [2005] ICR 1776 [48-54] 
(Mummery LJ); see further Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (2003 OUP) 453-454.    
66 See further the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Maternity and Parental Leave etc Regulations 
1999 (SI 1999/3312).   
67 [1966] 1 ITR 407.   
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his engagement when the business was sold did not entitle him to a redundancy 
payment or to the period of notice to which employees were statutorily entitled. 
Similarly, in Tiffin68 the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Tiffin was an LLP 
member rather than an employee meant that he was not entitled to claim 
compensation for unfair dismissal or redundancy when he was required to retire. 
This lack of protection is part of a wider pattern of reduced coverage of 
employment protection that has caused considerable concern.69   
 
Of course, where statutory rights attach to worker status, for example the 
protection of whistleblowers,70 limitations on working time71 and prohibitions on 
discrimination in relation to part time work,72 true LLP members (and possibly 
partners) may benefit in the same way as employed members. However, this will 
only assist if they fall within the definition of ‘worker’ in the relevant legislation 
and it is noteworthy that, in the light of Clyde, the government has permitted the 
exclusion from automatic enrolment in a workplace pension of true LLP members 
(although not those who are taxed as employees73).74   
 
In any event, the prohibitions on discrimination largely apply also to partners/LLP 
members75 (although they do not benefit from protection against discrimination 
in relation to fixed term contracts76).  Thus, in Train77 the EAT’s conclusion that 
Train was a partner meant that he could not bring a claim for unfair dismissal, 
although he could still bring a claim for unlawful age discrimination since the 
relevant equality legislation also applied to partners.   Furthermore, true 
partners/LLP members cannot be expelled unless there is a power to do so in the 
partnership/LLP agreement78 and any procedure specified therein is followed.79 
 
c) Restrictive covenants 
In principle, a restrictive covenant entered into with a partner/member or 
employee will be enforceable if it is reasonable between the parties and in 
accordance with the public interest in individuals being able to carry on their 
trade or profession freely, and thus is no greater than is reasonably necessary to 
protect a legitimate interest of the firm.80 However, covenants entered into with 
partners have not been scrutinised as strictly by the courts as those with 
employees,81 because the parties are in an equal bargaining position and are 
aware of the nature and extent of the restrictions required to protect the firm’s 
business,82 and because the covenant is entered into by each partner and may 
become binding on any one of them.83  Whether a partner or, presumably, an LLP 
                                                        
68 [2012] EWCA Civ 35 [2012] ICR 647.   
69 Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (n3) Ch 3.   
70 Employment Rights Act 1996, ss 43-43L and 230(3)(b).   
71 Working Time Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/1833).   
72 Part-term Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2001 (SI 2002/1551).   
73 (n37).   
74 The Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Automatic Enrolment) (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Regulations 2016 (SI 2016/311), Reg 4.   
75 For example, in Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes (a partnership) [2012] UKSC 16, [2012] 2 CMLR 
50 a partner who had been compulsorily retired in accordance with the partnership agreement was 
able to bring a claim for discrimination on grounds of age. 
76 See further the Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2001 
(SI 2002/2034).   
77 (n5).    
78 Partnership Act, s 25 and the LLP Regulations 2001, Reg 8.   
79 See further Peter De Maria, ‘Watertight Agreements’ (2014) 152 (1446) Accountancy 72, 74.   
80 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd [1894] AC 535 (HL).   
81 Whitehill v Bradford [1952] Ch 236 (CA) and Prescott v Dunwoody Sports Marketing [2007] EWCA 
Civ 461, [2007] 1 WLR 2343.   
82 Dallas McMillan & Sinclair v Simpson (1989) SLT 454 (OH) 456 (Lord Mayfield) and Naish v Thorp 
Wright & Puxon (a firm) (QB, 21 May 1998).   
83 Bridge v Deacons [1984] AC 705 (PC) 716 (Fraser LJ), citing the Australian case of Geraghty v 
Minter (1979) 142 CLR 177, 198 (Mason J).   
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member, is a true partner/member or an employee could therefore determine the 
enforceability of any covenant entered into by them.   
 
d) Liability of partners/LLP members 
A further reason why true partner status is significant is that s9 of the Partnership 
Act provides that (true) partners are personally liable to third parties for the 
partnership’s debts and obligations.84  Section 14 does extend this liability to 
those who are not true partners but appear to be partners, but only in limited 
circumstances;85 the person must have represented himself or knowingly allowed 
himself to be represented as a partner in a particular firm, and the third party 
must have given credit to the firm in reliance on the representation.  For 
example, in Walsh86 the claimants sued a partnership and its partners, and a 
dispute arose as to whether one of the defendants, Prior, was a partner in the 
firm or a person who had been held out as such and thus liable to the claimants, 
or only an employee and therefore not liable.  The court held that Prior was an 
employee rather than a true partner; but had been held out as a partner because 
he had sought and been granted partner status from the outset of his 
employment, was described as such on the firm’s notepaper and to other 
employees, and that the claimants were aware of this representation since the 
first claimant had been a client of the firm and would have seen its notepaper and 
his wife had been an employee of the firm while Prior worked there.  However, 
there was no evidence that claimants had relied on the representation, and in fact 
they had advanced funds to the firm both before and after Prior’s involvement in 
it.  He therefore incurred no liability to them under s14.   
 
Although true LLP membership generally has no significance to third parties, 
because LLP membership per se does not give rise to personal liability,87 there 
are exceptions to this.88  In addition, a shadow LLP member, that is to say a 
person who is not formally a member but ‘in accordance with whose directions or 
instructions the members of the [LLP] are accustomed to act’, other than a 
person who advises in a professional capacity, is liable to similar statutory 
sanctions relating to insolvency and disqualification orders to a true member.89 It 
may also be that the concept of a de facto LLP member will be recognised in the 
same way as that of a de facto director,90 the latter being a person who 
undertakes functions in relation to a company which could only properly 
discharged by a director,91 with the consequence that he is liable to similar 
insolvency sanctions and disqualification orders.  However, as the role of an LLP 
member is materially different to that of a director, being much broader and 
having fewer statutory duties, the application of the de facto member concept is 
uncertain.92   
 
6 The challenges of determining status  
Given the significance of status and the prohibition on dual employee and 
partner/LLP member status (and possibly on worker and partner status), the 
determination of status is crucial. Unfortunately, it is not without its difficulties, 
for reasons that will now be analysed. 
                                                        
84 Note also the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s 3.   
85 Partnership Act, s 14.   
86 (n12).   
87 LLP Act, s 1(2).   
88 See, for example, the LLP Act, s 6(4) and the Insolvency Act 1986, ss 213-214.   
89 LLP Regulations 2001, Reg 2 and the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 22(5) as 
applied by the LLP Regulations 2001, Reg 4(2).  See further Elspeth Berry and Rebecca Parry, Law of 
Insolvent Partnerships and LLPs (Wildy, Simmonds and Hill 2015) para 1.4.9.   
90 John Whittaker and John Machell, The Law of Limited Liability Partnerships (3rd edn, Bloomsbury 
Professional 2009) paras 8.41-8.42.   
91 Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] BCC 161 (Ch), 162 (Millet J).   




The courts have emphasised on a number of occasions that what is crucial to true 
partner status (and, as discussed below, employment status) is 
‘the substance of the relationship between the parties….the question 
whether or not there is a partnership depends on what the true 
relationship is, and not on any mere label attached to that relationship’.93  
The same is true of LLP member status, registration as a member being merely a 
label and not conclusive of true member status.  The LLP Act imposes substantive 
requirements similar to those of the Partnership Act for members to carry on a 
business together with a view of profit,94 and while it provides that the certificate 
of incorporation is conclusive proof that the LLP is incorporated95 it makes no 
equivalent provision for registration as a member to be conclusive.  Indeed, s4(2) 
provides that admission as a member is effected by agreement with the other 
members rather than by registration,96 and although membership changes must 
be registered97 there is no provision for an unregistered change to be ineffective 
per se.98 The courts have certainly not regarded registration as conclusive; in 
Ondra99 the court held that Reinhard was a member despite the fact that he was 
not registered, while in Tiffin100 the Court of Appeal’s reasons for holding Tiffin to 
be a member did not include that the fact that he was registered as such.101  
 
The courts have also been alert to the risk of deliberate mislabelling of the 
relationship in order to avoid legal obligations that would otherwise arise,102 as 
has the legislature in relation to tax (discussed above).  In Polegoshko and others 
v Ibragimov and others103 the court ordered rectification of the register of LLP 
members on the grounds that it did not reflect the reality of the ownership of the 
LLP.  Instead, the substantive factors determining whether a person is a true 
partner or LLP member include remuneration and whether it is fixed or dependent 
on profits, contribution to the firm’s capital, involvement in management and 
decisionmaking, and appearances and description of status.  
 
However, the position is sometimes obscured by the fact that a person may be 
held out as a partner to the outside world or registered as an LLP member, or 
treated as such by his co-partners/members for the purposes of internal rights 
and duties or profit shares, without necessarily being regarded as such by the 
law.  This is because it is common in firms for there to be more than one type of 
partner or member,104 only some of who are true partner/members.  Typically, 
there are equity partners/members who take part in management, contribute 
capital, and share profits; and other categories, including salaried and fixed share 
partners/members, which provide an intermediate status between equity 
partners/members and employees in terms of responsibility and remuneration.  
The EAT in Tiffin identified a salaried partner as one remunerated by a fixed or 
variable salary but held out to the world as a partner even though he does not 
enjoy all the rights of a partner, and noted that such a person can be a true 
                                                        
93 Stekel v Ellice [1973] 1 WLR 191 (Ch) 199 (Megarry J).   
94 LLP Act, s 2(1) and Partnership Act, s 1(1).  
95 LLP Act, s 3(2).  
96 LLP Act, s 4 and LLP Regulations 2001, Reg 7(5).   
97 LLP Act, s 9.   
98 LLP Act, s 6(3). 
99 (main judgment) (n18).   
100 (n17).   
101  The judgments in Clyde (n6) and Kovats (n29) make no reference to whether the respective 
claimants were registered as members.     
102 Firthglow Ltd (trading as Protectacoat) v Szilagyi [2009] EWCA Civ 98, [2009] ICR 835.     
103 [2015] EWHC 1669 (Ch), [2015] All ER (D) 273 (Jun).   
104 See further James Davies, Clive Greenwood and Fergus Payne, Employment, Partnership and 
Discrimination Law for Professional Partnerships (Legalease 2005) 7-16.   
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partner (as in Stekel v Ellice) or an employee (as in Briggs v Oates105);106 as the 
court pointed out in Stekel,  
‘The term “salaried partner” is not a term of art and to some extent it may 
be said to be a contradiction in terms’.107   
The EAT in Tiffin explained a fixed share partner as one who is principally 
remunerated by a fixed share of profits but is typically also entitled to a small 
share of residual profits and to participate in decisionmaking, and obliged to 
contribute a small sum of capital.108  Again, such a person could be a true 
partner/LLP member (as was Tiffin) or an employee.109  Section 2(3)(b) of the 
Partnership Act provides that the remuneration of an employee by a share of the 
partnership profits does not of itself make him a partner, and the courts have 
held that the absence of a right to share in profits does not prevent a person from 
being a partner.110 
 
In Tiffin, in which an ‘associate’ (an employee) was promoted to a ‘fixed share 
partner’ in a partnership which then converted to an LLP, the Court of Appeal held 
that the provisions of the LLP agreement made it obvious that the relationship 
between the full equity members and the fixed share members (all of whom were 
defined by the agreement as ‘equity partners’) was one of true LLP membership; 
all had to contribute capital, all had a prospect of a share of profits, including a 
share of any surplus assets on winding up, and all had a say in management.111  
The Court of Appeal contrasted this with the position under the agreement of 
salaried members, who had none of these rights, and ruled that the fact that the 
rights of the fixed share members might be much less than those of the equity 
members did not affect this conclusion. In Ondra, in which the LLP and Reinhard 
had entered into a contract which described the relationship as one of 
employment, the court held that Reinhard’s entitlement to play a part in 
management and to share in the profits, including any surplus assets on winding 
up, led ‘inevitably’ to the conclusion that he was an LLP member rather than an 
employee.112  In Williamson and Soden Solicitors v Briars113 the EAT held that the 
principal circumstance indicating partner rather than employee status was control 
in the sense of lawful authority to command.  In Kovats114 it concluded that 
Kovats was a true member and not an employee because his role was consistent 
with the members’ agreement and with the general duties of LLP members, he 
managed the business and his work was crucial to its success, he had 
considerable autonomy, he signed important documentation as a member which 
bound the LLP, he had some entitlement to a share of profits and to the proceeds 
on a winding up or sale, his drawings were paid gross and he accounted for 
income tax himself and paid self-employed national insurance contributions and, 
although he had made no direct capital contribution, he had accepted a significant 
reduction in salary when he joined the LLP.   
 
b) Employees   
                                                        
105 (n64).   
106 Tiffin v Lester Alldridge LLP UKEAT/0255/109/DM [2011] IRLR [7] (Silber J).   
107 (n93) 198 (Megarry J); see further Lindley & Banks on Partnership (n9) paras 5-54-5-56 and Mark 
Butler and David Milman, ‘Business participants and employment status: a review of the current 
position’ (2012) 33(6) Comp Law 165.   
108 (n106) [8] (Silber J).   
109 Cf Prassl, ‘Members, partners, employees, workers? Partnership law and employment status 
revisited’ (n33) 500 suggesting that fixed share status per se may be sufficient to denote employment 
status.   
110 Stekel (n93), M Young Legal Associates Ltd v Zahid (a firm) and others [2006] EWCA Civ 613, 
[2006] 1 WLR 2562 and Hodson v Hodson [2009] EWCA Civ 1025, [2010] PNLR 8.   
111 (n17).   
112 (main judgment) (n18) [45] (Warren J).   
113 [2011] UKEAT 0611/10/2005, [2011] All ER (D) 101 (Aug).  
114 (n29) [30] (Langstaff HJ).  
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The key statutes which confer rights on employees, the Employment Rights Act 
1996115 and the Trade Unions and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992,116 
define an employee as an individual who has entered into or works under a 
contract of employment, and determining whether a particular individual is such a 
person has been a perennial problem for the courts.117 As with partner or LLP 
member status, the label which the parties attach to the relationship is not 
decisive of employee - or indeed worker - status:118 the courts have emphasised 
that it is necessary to consider all the factors and look at the overall picture.119 
The purpose for which the determination of status is made may also affect that 
determination, as the courts have asserted a public policy interest in ensuing that 
statutory protection, including health and safety,120 is not avoided merely by 
reclassifying the claimant’s status.121 In Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher and others122 the 
Supreme Court described the key factors (many of which may be contrasted with 
those indicating partner/LLP member status) as follows:   
(i) The employee agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other 
remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the 
performance of some service for his master123 (in contrast to a 
partner/LLP member typically sharing profits, albeit that this is not 
essential).  
(ii) The employee agrees that in the performance of that service he will 
be subordinated to the other's control in a sufficient degree to 
make that other master124 (in contrast to the autonomy of a 
partner/LLP member125). 
(iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a 
contract of service (as opposed to, for example, a partnership or 
LLP agreement).126  
(iv) There must be an irreducible minimum of obligation on each side, 
in other words the mutual obligations to provide and be available 
for work.127  
(v) If a genuine right of substitution exists,128 this negates an 
obligation to perform work personally and is usually inconsistent 
with employee status.129 Indeed, personal service is a hallmark of 
both employment130 and partnership/LLP membership, in contrast 
                                                        
115 Section 230(1).   
116 Section 295.   
117 See further Freedland (n65) 14ff, Simon Deakin, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialisation, 
Employment and Legal Evolution (2004 OUP) 303-313 and Guy Davidov, ‘The Reports of My Death are 
Greatly Exaggerated: ‘Employee’ as a Viable (Though Over-used) Legal Concept’ in Guy Davidov and 
Brian Langille (eds), Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (2006 Hart).   
118 Young & Woods v West [1980] IRLR 201 (CA).   
119 Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173 (QB) approved and applied 
by the Privy Council in Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung [1990] 2 AC 374 (PC). See also Castle 
Construction (Chesterfield) Ltd v HMRC [2008] UKSPC SPC00723, [2009] STC (SCD) 97 [68] (Howard 
M Nowlan Special Commissioner).   
120 Lane v The Shire Roofing Company (Oxford) Ltd [1995] PIQR P417, 421 (Henry LJ).   
121 Ferguson v John Dawson and Partners (Contractors) Limited [1976] 1 WLR 1213 (CA).   
122 [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] ICR 1157 [18-19] (Lord Clarke).   
123 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 
497 (QB) 515.   
124Ready Mixed Concrete (n123).   
125 Although partners/LLP members do have some control over each other’s work, and indeed over 
each other’s property in the form of capital.  See also Ronald H Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937) 
4(16) Economica 386, 403 n3 and 404.   
126 Ready Mixed Concrete (n123).   
127 Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner [1984] ICR 612 (CA) 623 (Stephenson LJ) and Carmichael v 
National Power plc [1999] ICR 1226 (HL).   
128 Cf the mere existence of a substitution clause which does not reflect the real relationship  
(Consistent Group Ltd v Kalwak Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 430 [2008] IRLR 505 [57] (Elias J), cited in 
Firthglow (n102) [54] (Smith LJ).   
129 Express & Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton [1999] ICR 693 (CA) 699 (Peter Gibson LJ).   
130 Stack v Ajar-Tec Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 46, [2015] IRLR 474.    
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to an independent contractor who can choose who he engages to 
perform the work contracted for.131  
In addition, and of particular relevance in the partner/LLP member context, the 
courts will consider whether the individual is carrying on business on his own 
account with the associated financial risks – as do partners and LLP members, 
who usually have a direct interest in the profits of the firm,132 and in particular 
partners, who have unlimited personal liability133 - or merely doing so for 
another.134 Although a director who is also a controlling shareholder, and thus in 
reality working on his own account, has been held still to be capable of being an 
employee,135 the judgment in Clyde136 indicates that this approach will not be 
taken to LLP members because s4(4) has aligned them with partners rather than 
directors, and the lack of a separate person to work for has prevented this 
approach being taken to partners. Other factors which have been held to be 
relevant include whether it is a permanent engagement unrelated to a specific 
duration or task,137 the provision of the necessary facilities and equipment by the 
business,138 the integration of the person into the business,139 and the intentions 
of the parties.140 Functionally, it is therefore possible for a partnership or LLP to 
behave as an employer,141 but the pertinent question is whether a particular 
person is its employee or a true partner/member.  Lady Hale in Clyde stated that 
there was no ‘magic test’, in particular a relationship of subordination, to 
determine whether a person was an employee or a worker, and that it depended 
on the wording of the statute.142  This apparently overrules the judgment of the 
Supreme Court only three years earlier in Jivraj v Hashwani, in which it held that 
subordination was an essential element in the employment relationship,143 and 
allows the employment relationship, with its associated protections, to be 
construed more widely.144  
 
In the lights of these criteria, or those for partnership, the EAT in Williamson145 
concluded that an employee who was promoted to a salaried partner was still an 
employee.  It noted that he took no significant risk of loss, the fact that he 
shared in profits could be persuasive towards partner status but was not 
determinative, he was subject to the control of the firm, the governance of which 
was within the hands of the equity partners on essential matters, and the parties 
behaved as if he was still an employee.  Had a change from employment to 
partner status been intended by the parties, it was to be expected that the 
paperwork would have more clearly reflected that change given the significant 
obligations on partners imposed by the authority and liability provisions of the 
                                                        
131  The courts have recognised a very limited exception where employees’ contracts permitted them 
to provide a substitute only when they were unable to work and only from a list of substitutes 
provided by the employer, and the employer paid the substitute directly and indeed sometimes 
arranged the substitution (Macfarlane and ington v Glasgow City Council [2000] UKEAT 
1277/99/1075, [2001] IRLR 7).   
132 Partnership Act 1890, s 24(1) and the LLP Regulations 2001, Reg 7(1).   
133 Partnership Act, s 9 and the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s 3.   
134 Market Investigations Ltd (n119) 184-185 (Cooke J). 
135 Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12 and Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform v Neufeld [2009] EWCA Civ 280, [2009] 3 All ER 790.    
136 (n6).   
137 Davies v Braithwaite [1931] 2 KB 628 (KB).  
138 Market Investigations Ltd (n119). 
139 Market Investigations Ltd (n119).   
140 Express & Echo Publications (n129). 
141 Prassl, ‘Members, partners, employees, workers? Partnership law and employment status revisited’ 
(n33) 500.   
142 Clyde (n6) [39]. 
143 [2011] UKSC 40, [2011] 1 WLR 1872 [27], [34], [39] (Lord Clarke).   
144 Prassl, ‘Members, partners, employees, workers? Partnership law and employment status revisited’ 
(n33) 503.   
145 (n113).  
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Partnership Act.  In contrast, in Train146 the EAT concluded that Train was not an 
employee but a partner, even though he and his four former partners had formed 
companies (in which they were all shareholders) to operate the business and he 
was paid through the PAYE system, had a fixed holiday entitlement, devoted the 
whole of his time to the business, was integrated into it and was held out as 
being an employee, because he had no written contract of service, his salary was 
liable to vary according to profits and there was limited control over his work and 
limited mutuality of obligation.  
 
c) Workers 
In recent years, statutory rights have often been given to the wider category of 
‘workers’ rather than employees, which increases the range of individuals to 
whom the relevant statutory protections apply.  The legislation generally defines 
a worker as an individual who works under a contract of employment, or under 
‘any other contract…. whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform 
personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is 
not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or 
business undertaking carried on by the individual’,147 although the exact wording 
of the exclusion of client contracts varies148 and not all statutes contain this 
exclusion.149  The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 2006150 (TUPE Regulations) refer to an employee but define it in 
similar terms as ‘an individual who works for another person whether under a 
contract of service or otherwise’ excluding ‘anyone who provides services under a 
contract for services’. As with employees, the label is not conclusive, and the 
purpose for which status is being determined may be influential, for example the 
protection of a whistleblower in Clyde.   
 
The Supreme Court in Clyde151 agreed with Maurice Kay LJ in Hospital Medical 
Group Ltd v Westwood152 that neither the integration of the worker in the 
business (as opposed to his being able to market his services to the world) nor 
the dominant purpose of the contract being the provisions of personal services 
(as opposed to them being an ancillary feature) were determinative, but also held 
(contrary to its earlier judgment in Jivraj v Hashwani153) that it was not essential 
for there be an element of subordination; it was more important to focus on 
applying the words of the statute in question to the facts of the case at issue, and 
no single test of worker status was determinative.154 This apparent minimising of 
the importance of subordination reflects the fact that the traditional view of 
individuals obeying orders in determining the organisation of their work is not 
well adapted to professional service firms,155 in which individuals typically enjoy a 
considerable degree of autonomy and independence and owe duties to clients.156  
Subordination also potentially conflicts with the requirement of mutuality of 
obligation, and indeed the latter appears to have been accorded more weight in 
                                                        
146 (n5).   
147 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 230(3)(b); see also the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992, s 296 and the Pensions Act 2008, s 88.   
148 For example, the Employment Relations Act 1996, s 230(3) defines a worker similarly except that 
it excludes a contract with a person who is a client or customer of any profession or business carried 
on by the individual, rather than a contract with a professional client. 
149 For example, the Equality Act 2010, s 83(2).   
150 SI 2006/246, Reg 2(1).   
151 (n6).   
152 [2012] EWCA Civ 1005, [2013] ICR 415.   
153 (n143).   
154 (n6) [39] (Lady Hale).   
155 See further Arturo Bronstein, International and Comparative Labour Law: Current Challenges 
(Palgrave Macmillan and the International Labour Office 2009), 45-49.   
156 Hugh P Gunz and Sally P Gunz, ‘Professional Ethics in Formal Organizations’ in Royston Greenwood 
and Roy Suddaby (eds), Professional Service Firms (Emerald Group 2006). 
 15 
relation to casual workers,157 which exemplifies the lack of coherence in this area.  
However, subordination should not be discounted entirely  as it is  is still relevant 
when considering whether the individual is working for the firm or on their own 
account, and thus whether the centre of gravity of the relationship tends towards 
the firm’s business or the individual’s own business.158 Although Bates van 
Winkelhof was a junior equity LLP member, received a share of profits and 
worked principally in an associated firm overseas, the Supreme Court concluded 
that she was a worker for the purposes of s230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights 
Act 1996 (and could thus benefit from the protection given to whistleblowers) 
because she could not market her services to anyone other than the LLP and was 
an integral part of the business, and the LLP was in no sense her client or 
customer.  
 
Whether a true LLP member can be a worker for the purposes of other statutes 
will of course depend on the definition of a worker used in the legislation and the 
particular facts of the case.159  For example, the exclusion from the definition in 
the TUPE Regulations of a person who provides services under a contract for 
services covers, as Glidewell J noted in Cowell, ‘precisely the position of a normal 
equity partner’160 and thus of an equity LLP member. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, the government has already limited the application of worker pension 
protection to LLP members.   
 
Whether true partners can also, in principle, be workers, has not yet been 
established. Public Concern at Work recommended that both partners and LLP 
members be explicitly included in the definition of ‘worker’ for the purposes of 
whistleblowing protection161 but the government concluded that the judgment in 
Clyde made further legislative change unnecessary in relation to LLP members162 
and, unfortunately, overlooked the remaining question of the status of partners: 
its guidance on whistleblowing now states that an LLP member is protected but 
makes no reference to partners.163  
 
In Clyde, Lady Hale noted that the question of whether partners could be workers 
was ‘a very different question from whether they can be employees’164 and Lord 
Carnwath emphasised that the ruling did ‘not necessarily have any direct 
relevance to the resolution of equivalent issues in relation to other forms of 
partnership’.165  This has been taken by some to indicate that the distinction 
between employees and workers is ‘a much more stark one than hitherto 
assumed’,166 but it is more likely that the Supreme Court was merely emphasising 
                                                        
157 O’Kelly and others v Trusthouse Forte plc [1984] QB 90 (CA), 106 (Ackner LJ) citing the judgment 
of the Industrial Tribunal, and Carmichael (n125).  However, O’Kelly was decided before the full 
development of the requirement of mutuality of obligations, and its main focus was on the 
issue of the appeal process in tribunal cases. 
158 Bob Hepple, Restructuring Employment Rights (1986) 15 ILJ 69, 75.   
159 Clive Greenwood and Christopher Hitchins, ‘Pensions: enrolment and partnerships’ (2014) 111(24) 
LS Gaz 20. 
160 (n4) 394. This case concerned the identical definition in the predecessor to that legislation, the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794).  
161 The Whistleblowing Commission, Report on the effectiveness of existing arrangements for 
workplace whistleblowing in the UK (November 2013) 
<www.pcaw.org.uk/files/WBC%20Report%20Final.pdf> accessed 25 May 2016.   
162 BIS, Whistleblowing Framework Call for Evidence: Government Response (June 2014) 17 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323399/bis-14-914-
whistleblowing-framework-call-for-evidence-government-response.pdf> accessed 25 May 2016.   
163 Whistleblowing for employees (updated 2 July 2015) <www.gov.uk/whistleblowing> accessed 25 
May 2016.    
164 (n6) [26].   
165 (n6) [55].  
166 Prassl, ‘Members, partners, employees, workers? Partnership law and employment status revisited’  
(n33) 502.  
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that its judgment was limited to LLP members, and that existing caselaw on 
partners was limited to their employment status. 
 
The key element in worker status and the rationale for the associated regulatory 
protection is the individual’s dependency on the relationship, which arises from 
the exclusivity of the engagement – in the case of partners as with LLP members 
- as opposed to him being able to spread his risks among a number of different 
relationships;167 whether the engagement gravitates towards the firm’s business 
or that of the individual.168  As the EAT explained in Byrne Bros (Formwork) Ltd v 
Baird and Others:169 
‘The reason why employees are thought to need such protection is that 
they are in a subordinate and dependent position vis-à-vis their 
employers: the purpose of the Regulations is to extend protection to 
workers who are, substantively and economically, in the same position. 
Thus the essence of the intended distinction must be between, on the one 
hand, workers whose degree of dependence is essentially the same as that 
of employees and, on the other, contractors who have a sufficiently arm's-
length and independent position to be treated as being able to look after 
themselves in the relevant respects.’ 
However, similar policy arguments could be made in respect of employee 
shareholders (employees granted shares in their employer which have a 
minimum value of £2000), yet they are automatically deprived of certain 
employment rights that they would otherwise have.170 Moreover, this passage 
was cited by the Court of Appeal in Redrow Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd v Wright 
Roberts and others v Redrow Homes (North West) Ltd171 with the significant 
caveat, reflected in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Clyde, that the focus must 
remain on the statutory definition of the term ‘worker’ and the obligations of the 
parties under the contract. It may therefore be that a partner cannot be a worker 
because the definition requires the individual to work under a contract for 
‘another party’ and while an LLP is another party; because it is a separate legal 
person, a partnership is not, because it includes the (true) partner himself.172  
 
7 Conclusion 
The answer currently given by the courts to the question of when a partner or LLP 
member is not actually a partner or member, is that a person who purports to be 
a partner or member cannot be a true partner/member if he is also an employee.  
This is despite the fact that a person who is a sole company director and 
controlling shareholder can simultaneously be an employee and that, absent 
s4(4) of the LLP Act which aligns LLP members with partners instead, a true LLP 
member might be though to be in an analogous position for the purposes of 
employment law, given that both companies and LLPs have separate legal 
personality.  In contrast, those who are merely held out as partners or registered 
as LLP members (but are not true partners or members) can seemingly possess 
this more limited status simultaneously with employee status.  An LLP member 
can be both a true member and a worker, although it is not yet clear whether a 
true partner can be a worker.  
 
What the law requires here is greater clarity. First, the legislation should state 
clearly that a true LLP member or partner cannot simultaneously be an employee, 
but that nothing in the legislation prevents such a person from being a worker.  
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This would reflect the jurisprudence on the employment status of partners and 
(arguably) LLP members, and the worker status of LLP members. While the 
worker status of partners has not yet been established, a legislative statement to 
this effect would overcome the difficulties for the courts of taking such an 
approach, and it is justified by the arguments set out above for the application of 
worker protection to those in a dependent relationship. Second, the legislation 
should explain the distinction between true partners or members, and other types 
of partner or member. The jurisprudence gives some guidance as to the factors 
which determine true partner or member status (for example, management, 
capital contribution and profit sharing), but neither the partnership nor the LLP 
legislation refers to this, or to its interaction with relevant provisions of tax law.  
The legislation should reflect current commercial practice by setting out the 
indicators of true partner or member status established by the courts and, in the 
case of the LLP legislation, could also utilise the criteria adopted in the tax 
legislation on the disguised employment of LLP members.173 Third, the legislation 
should clarify the significance of this distinction.  The LLP Act should explain, as 
does s14 of the Partnership Act in relation to those held out as partners, that 
those who are merely registered as members may incur liability to third parties 
as true members (including in the circumstances set out in s6(4) of the LLP Act 
and other exceptions to limited liability as established in the company context). 
Both the partnership and the LLP legislation should also confirm that such 
persons will not be treated as true partners or members for other purposes such 
as tax or discrimination legislation, and should state that nothing in the 
partnership or LLP legislation prevents them simultaneously being employees or 
workers under employee or worker protection legislation.  
 
The terms ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ are also ripe for clarification; the statement 
that ‘the judicial concepts approach anarchy’174 made over 30 years remains – 
with the possible addition of the legislative concepts – true today. The law 
discussed in this article in relation to partners and LLP members reflects the wider 
context in which an increasing number of labour relationships fall outside the 
traditional concept of an employment contract and thus potentially outside the 
scope of the statutory protections offered to employees.175 The courts have been 
prepared to take a flexible approach in order to prevent this,176 albeit at the 
expense of coherence in the law, but it needs to be recognised in both the 
partnership/LLP legislation and the employment protection legislation that the 
relationships between true partners, or between true LLP members and their LLP, 
are fundamentally different to, and therefore quite properly not regarded as, 
employment relationships.  In contrast, the legislature’s increasing use of the 
term ‘worker’ has brought true LLP members within the scope of at least some 
statutory worker protection, but carve-outs have already been made in relation to 
pensions, and in the absence of judicial confirmation of partners’ worker status or 
lack thereof, legislative clarification is needed; LLPs are already examining the 
application of worker rights to their members, and partnerships need to know 
whether they should be doing the same.177  
                                                        
173 (n36). 
174 Jon Clark and Lord Wedderburn, ‘Modern Labour Law: Problems, Functions and Policies’, in Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund (Lord Wedderburn, Roy Lewis and Jon Clark 
(eds) (1983 Clarendon).   
175 See further Simon Deakin, ‘The Comparative Evolution of the Employment Relationship’ in Davidov 
and Langille (eds) (n117).   
176 Ferguson (n121).   
177 See, for example, Clare Murray, ‘Members as workers’ (2014) 16(10) MP 72 and Sarah Ozanne, 
‘New rights for partners’ (2014) Jul/Aug Emp LJ 15, 17.   
